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Abstract 
We study the relationship between past returns on a company’s stock and the level of investment in that 
stock by participants in that firm’s 401(k) plan. Several different decision points are of interest: the initial 
fraction of savings allocated to company stock, the changes in this fraction, and the reallocations of 
portfolio holdings across different asset classes. We find that high past returns on company stock do 
induce participants to allocate more of their new contributions to company stock. By contrast, high 
company stock have the opposite effect on reallocations of portfolio holdings: high returns produce 
portfolio shifts away from company stock and into other forms of equity. Overall, for company stock 
decisions, participants in our sample appear to be momentum investors when making contribution 
decisions, but they are contrarian investors when making trading decisions. 
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Chapter 7
Employee Investment Decisions 
about Company Stock
James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, 
and Andrew Metrick
Recent high-profile cases have illustrated the dangers of employee invest-
ment in company stock. These debacles are unlikely to be the last ones, or
even the most severe. Companies with more than 50 percent of retirement
assets in company stock are common, and fractions over 80 percent con-
tinue to prevail at such large companies as Procter & Gamble, Anheuser-
Busch, and Pfizer.1
The concentration of retirement wealth in company stock is a clear viola-
tion of diversification principles. Recently, several studies have quantified
the economic costs of this concentration. Muelbroek (2002) uses a Sharpe-
ratio approach and finds that the average diversification cost of company
stock is about 42 percent of its value. Ramaswamy (2003) uses option-pric-
ing techniques to compute the cost of insuring the extra risk of company
stock. For a range of plausible parameter values, he finds that this insur-
ance would be prohibitively expensive.2
Despite these high costs, companies continue to offer employee stock in
their retirement plans. There are many potential explanations for this behav-
ior, but none are entirely satisfying. For example, employers may believe that
stock compensation is inexpensive relative to cash, that there are strong
incentive or morale effects, or that friendly employees will aid management
in a takeover or other proxy battle. Mitchell and Utkus (2003) review these
arguments and find little evidence to support them. The only explanation
with any significant empirical support is tax-driven: Dividends paid to certain
employee ownership plans are tax-deductible at the corporate level. Liang
and Weisbenner (2002) find a significant relationship between company
stock fractions of total contributions and dividend payout. Nevertheless,
this finding can explain only part of the puzzle, as many firms without any
The authors thank Hewitt Associates for their help in providing the data. They are particularly
grateful to Lori Lucas and Jim McGhee at Hewitt. Choi acknowledges financial support from 
a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Laibson and Madrian acknow-
ledge financial support from the National Institute on Aging (R01-AG-16605 and R29-AG-013020
respectively). Laibson also acknowledges financial support from the MacArthur Foundation.
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dividends still have significant employee ownership of company stock in
their plans.
Even when employers offer their stock, of course, it does not mean that
employees must buy it. While many plans make matched contributions in
company stock, and some of these plans restrict employees’ rights to sell
this stock for some period of time, there is still a significant amount of
discretionary contributions to company stock. Benartzi (2001) was the first
to investigate this behavior and provided an interesting explanation for
it. Using a sample of about half of the S&P 500 companies, he found that
discretionary contributions to company stock are positively correlated with
the past returns on that stock. He posited that this correlation was due to
employees’ extrapolation of past returns when forming expectations about
future returns. Liang and Weisbenner (2002) confirmed his result for
a larger number of companies over a longer time period.
Both of these prior studies rely on firm-level data drawn from SEC
filings, which report a firm’s average contribution fraction to company
stock. Thus, these studies use data for a large number of firms to analyze
cross-sectional relationships between firm characteristics and employee
discretionary contributions to company stock. Our analysis looks at some
similar questions, but our approach is distinct and complementary: We use
time-series variation in returns at three large firms’ 401(k) plans, from
1992 to 2000, to identify the effect of returns on the company stock choices
of 94,191 plan participants. Our objective is to use this time-series variation
to better understand the mechanisms by which past returns influence
employee investment. Specifically, we attempt to measure the extent of
“feedback” investing in company stock, to analyze whether participants are
momentum or contrarian investors. Momentum investors trade with
a trend, adding to their holdings after high returns; contrarian investors
do the opposite. An active finance literature has developed in the past few
years to look at the empirical evidence on feedback trading.3 By focusing
on a salient asset class—company stock—we hope to make a contribution
to this literature while at the same time providing useful insights for the
policy debate on company stock investment.
Description of Our Data
The data used to examine these patterns were provided by Hewitt
Associates, a large benefits administration and consulting firm. From
Hewitt’s roster of clients, we identified three large companies, which we
denote here as Alpha, Delta, and Gamma, which offered company stock as
an investment option. We obtained detailed data on individual participant
in each plan, with two components. The first is panel data on every trans-
action that occurred in the plans since Hewitt took over the plan admin-
istration. These data go from January 4, 1993 to October 20, 1999 for
122 James J. Choi et al.
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Alpha; January 31, 1994 to January 26, 2000 for Delta; and April 3, 1996
to March 3, 2000 for Gamma. The second component of the data is cross-
sectional, taken at year-end 1998 and 1999, which reports participant data
on demographics, hire, and enrollment dates, and balance for all partici-
pants with a positive balance or plan activity in 1998 or 1999. We will refer
to December 31, 1999 as the “final date.” None of these companies are
financial services or technology companies.4
Table 7-1 summarizes information on participants’ demographic statistics
who were active in the plans at the final date (a subset of the 94,191 total
employees). The average plan balance for these participants was $89,172.
The most comparable cross-sectional data to ours is the EBRI/ICI sample
of 401(k) plans, which covers about 35 percent of the assets in the 401(k)
universe. Holden and VanDerhei (2001) report that average plan balances
at the end of 1999 are broken down by plan size, and they find that average
plan balances are positively correlated with the number of participants in
the plan (this is mainly because larger companies tend to have started plans
earlier, thus giving more time for balances to be accumulated). For plans
with over 10,000 participants—like all three of our plans—they report an
average balance of $73,672, which is quite comparable.
Table 7-2 breaks down the contribution fraction and asset holdings
into three non-disjoint asset classes. Company stock contribution fractions
were approximately 17 percent at Alpha, 5 percent at Delta, 12 percent at
Gamma, and 10 percent as a participant-weighted average across the three
companies. The holdings in company stock were similar to the contri-
bution fractions at Gamma, but they were significantly higher at Alpha
(32 percent versus 17 percent) and Delta (8 percent versus 5 percent). The
disparity at Alpha is partly due to the fact that Alpha made matching con-
tributions in company stock and placed some tenure restrictions on selling
these contributions. Like most clients of Hewitt Associates, Delta and
Gamma did not match in company stock and placed no restrictions on the
holdings of company stock.
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TABLE 7-1 Demographic Summary Statistics
Average age 45.0
Average salary ($) 55,830
Average tenure at company (years) 15.8
Average elected contribution rate (%) 8.73
Average plan balance ($) 89,172
Percent who traded in 1999 (%) 39.3
Total companies 3
Total participants (all years) 94,191
Note : Unless otherwise noted, all figures are as of year-end 1999.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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These holdings fractions are somewhat lower than the averages reported
by Holden and VanDerwei (2001) using the EBRI/ICI database. They found
that, among larger plans (5,000 participants) with similar investment offer-
ings to our sample companies, the average holding of company stock was
24 percent of the portfolio. Note, however, that many of the plans in this class
of the EBRI/ICI sample were similar to company Alpha, in that they matched
contributions in company stock and imposed some trading restrictions on
these matched contributions. Nevertheless, even Alpha had lower company
stock holdings than the average company that matched in company stock.
While the main focus of the chapter is on company stock, it is also useful
to know the relationship between past returns and employee allocations to
other asset classes. These relationships are not only interesting in themselves,
but they are also important for knowing whether changes in company stock
investments crowded out other equities. We consider two other asset classes
in the chapter: “Total equity” includes all equity holdings, domestic and
international, including company stock,5 and “other equity,” which is total
equity minus company stock.
Our focus on the initial contribution fractions to these asset classes,
subsequent changes in these contribution fractions, and trades across the
classes. Before turning to these analyses, it is useful to examine the empir-
ical frequency of changes and trades. Figure 7-1 plots the likelihood of ever
having made a change to contribution fractions, or a trade as a function of
tenure in the plan. By 3 years after initial enrollment, almost half percent
of participants had made at least one change to their initial contribution
fraction, and 47 percent had made a trade.6 These two groups overlap
significantly, so that their union comprises only 58 percent of the full
sample. By 6 years after enrollment, these percentages were over 70 percent
for either of the two activities separately, and 80 percent for either.
Figure 7-2 plots the frequency of trades per year for all individuals that
had at least 3 years’ participation as of the final date. Within this whole
124 James J. Choi et al.
TABLE 7-2 Summary Statistics on Equity Holdings
Company Other All Equities (%)
Stock (%) Equities (%)
Company Alpha Contributions 16.6 51.8 68.4
Holdings 31.5 39.7 71.2
Company Delta Contributions 4.5 49.6 54.1
Holdings 8.1 48.6 56.7
Company Gamma Contributions 12.0 52.1 64.1
Holdings 11.4 53.5 64.8
Participant-weighted Contributions 9.9 50.8 60.7
total Holdings 17.7 46.0 63.6
Note : Discretionary contributions and year-end balances held that in equities in 1999.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 7-1. Likelihood of trading, changing elections, or doing either at least once,
by tenure in plan, 12/31/1992 to 3/6/2000.
Notes : We examine all people for whom we have data since their initial enrollment in the
plans. The graph depicts the percent of participants who have made at least one trade,
changed their discretionary contribution allocations at least once, or done either, plotted
against the number of years we observe them in the plan.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 7-2. Histogram of participant trades per year, 1999 participants.
Notes : We examine all people who are active in the plans as of year-end 1999 and who have
been participating for at least three years. We divide the total number of times a participant
has traded in our data by the number of years we observe the participant. The graph is a
histogram of this ratio.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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group, 38 percent never made a trade. The next highest grouping was
between 0.26 and 0.50 trades per year, with 37 percent of participants
falling into this range. Very few participants made more than half a trade
per year. Overall, these trading frequencies are somewhat higher than for
the typical firm in the Hewitt universe, most likely because these firms were
“early adopters” of the Internet channel for trading and other participant
activities (Choi et al., 2002a).
Analysis of Initial Contribution Fractions
To investigate the initial contribution fraction, we use a Tobit regression
equation of the following form,
Yi    Xi  i , (1)
where Yi is the fraction of company stock (censored below at 0 and above at 1)
other equity, or total equity out of the total contribution: Xi is a vector of
firm-level and participant-level characteristics that may explain the cross-
sectional pattern of flow decisions; and i is a participant-level error term.
While we employ panel-data notation to distinguish among participants
and initial dates, these regressions used only one observation per particip-
ant. The sample included every participant with positive balances or plan
activity in 1998 or 1999. For each member of the sample, we included 
a single observation made on the date he first enrolled in their plan, and
all explanatory variables for that participant (Xi) are measured on that
same date.
We include several firm-level variables in the Xi vector. The main vari-
ables of interest are the past returns on company stock and on the overall
stock market. Since we seek to separate common shocks (stock market
returns) and firm-specific shocks (company stock returns), we include two
past return variables. SP500 is the past return for the S&P 500 in the one
year (253 trading days) preceding the enrollment of participant i. That is,
if participant i enrolled on date t, then SP500i is the return from trading
date t  253 to trading date t  1. CSTOCKi is the excess return over the
S&P 500 for the company stock of participant i. Like SP500, it is measured
over the preceding 253 trading days. Thus, all participants who enrolled
on the same date t will have identical SP500 values; all participants who
enrolled on the same date t at the same company will have identical
CSTOCK values. For notational convenience, we drop the i subscripts for
the remainder of this discussion. Previous research suggests that invest-
ment behavior is also influenced by the variance of past returns. Thus, we
include two variance measures in X. Std(SP500) and Std(CSTOCK) are the
standard deviations of the daily returns on the S&P 500 and company stock
over the 253 trading days preceding the enrollment of participant i. Finally,
126 James J. Choi et al.
Utkas-07.qxd  27/5/04  3:01 PM  Page 126
we include a separate fixed effect and trend for each company, and omit
a regression constant term.
We also include several participant-level variables as elements of X.
Consistent with past work, we posit that total equity fractions are related
to age, probably in a hump-shaped relationship with equity fractions first
increasing and then decreasing later in life. (Consistent relationships
across studies have been elusive in the literature, however.7) We include
Age and Age2 as elements of X. In addition, several studies show that overall
equity holdings are positively related to salary; including Holden and
VanDerhei (2001). For company stock, however, they find little relation-
ship between salary and company stock fractions, with just a hint of slight
negative tilt at the highest salary levels. Since we lack data on wealth, we
rely on salary as a proxy and include the log of annualized salary for the
year of enrollment as an element of X.
Company stock contributions may also be related to job tenure. Workers
with longer tenure at enrollment could differ from other participants
along several dimensions. Since they have been at the company longer,
they may have more human capital dedicated to the company, which
should induce lower contributions to company stock, other things equal.
On the other hand, they may have a greater loyalty to the company and feel
more of a duty to invest in company stock. Finally, workers who first partici-
pate later in their careers may have waited to do so because they are less
financially sophisticated. This lower sophistication may be correlated with
poorer diversification and higher contributions to company stock. The rel-
ative importance of these different factors is an empirical question, though
Holden, VanDerhei, and Quick (2000) report a positive relationship in
their study. Accordingly we include a variable, TENURE, which is the log
of 1  job tenure (in years), as an element of X.
Estimated coefficients are reported in Table 7-3. The dependent variable
is the percent of the participant’s pay invested in company stock in column 1,
other equity in column 2, and total equity in column 3. The results show a
strong impact of past returns on the initial contribution fractions to com-
pany stock. The coefficients on both SP500 and CSTOCK are positive and
significant when the dependent variable is company stock (column 1); con-
versely, the coefficients on these two variables are negative and significant
when the dependent variable is other equity (column 2). These respective
coefficients are positive but insignificant for total equity (column 3).
This pattern of results suggests that when company stock returns are high,
newly enrolled participants contribute a higher fraction of their flows to
company stock and a lower fraction of their flows to other equity; on net, the
fraction of flows allocated to all equity (total equity) tends to cancel. Thus,
these past returns—both the marketwide (SP500) and company-specific
(CSTOCK)—have mostly a compositional effect on overall equity holdings.
7 / Employee Investment Decisions about Company Stock 127
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TABLE 7-3 Initial Contribution Allocation, 11/30/1992 to 2/17/2000, as 
a Function of Asset Returns Prior to Plan Enrollment
Company Stock Other Equities All Equities
SP500 0.80** 0.46** 0.04
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
CSTOCK 0.45** 0.14** 0.07
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Std(SP500) 12.76* 3.36 2.21
(5.16) (4.10) (4.79)
Std(CSTOCK) 12.13** 2.47 0.39
(3.55) (2.91) (3.41)
Salary 0.08** 0.16** 0.11**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age/100 0.02 0.26 0.24
(0.50) (0.41) (0.48)
Age2/1000 0.04 0.09 0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Tenure 0.02* 0.06** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend  0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Company Trend  0.08** 0.17** 0.14**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend 	 0.07** 0.06** 0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
() 0.76** 0.69** 0.80**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the percent of the participant’s first payroll con-
tribution that went to company stock, the dependent variable in column 2 is the percent of the
participant’s first payroll contribution that went to other equities, and the dependent variable
in column 3 is the percent of the participant’s first payroll contribution that went to all equities.
Coefficients shown are for tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. SP500 is the cumulative return
on the S&P 500 for the 253 trading days prior to the participant’s enrollment in the plan.
CSTOCK is the cumulative return in excess of the S&P 500 on company stock for the 253 trad-
ing days prior to participant enrollment. Std(SP500) and Std(CSTOCK) are the standard devia-
tions of the S&P 500 and company stock returns, respectively, over the 253 trading days prior to
the participant’s enrollment. Salary is the log of annual salary in the year of enrollment (in 1999
CPI-deflated dollars), Age is the participant’s age at the time of enrollment, Age 2 is the square of
Age, and Tenure is the log of one plus the years between the participant’s original hire date and
plan enrollment date. Company Trend x is the years between December 31, 1980 and the partici-
pant’s enrollment if the participant is in Company x, and zero otherwise. () is the standard
deviation of the latent variable’s residual. Coefficients on fixed-effect company dummies and a
constant are not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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For the other independent variables, we find results consistent with
previous studies. The coefficients on age and age 2 (column 3), while not
significant, are consistent with a hump-shaped relationship between the
total equity fraction and age. The relationship between salary and total
equity is positive and significant, while the relationship between salary and
company stock fraction is negative and significant.
One possible criticism of these results is that the standard errors may
be understated. If firm-specific shocks induce correlated behavior across
participants enrolling around the same time, then the assumption of cross-
sectionally independent residuals would be violated, and the standard
errors would be biased downward. For example, if firms changed their
communication strategies to new participants, then these new strategies
could induce correlated behavior. In this case, it would appear that we have
more independent observations than we really do.
A comment is in order regarding this possibility. First, the regression
specification controls for firm-specific differences in average behavior
(with fixed effects) and for firm-specific changes in this average behavior
over time (with trend variables for each firm). To also control for firm-
specific shocks would require a specification of the correlation structure
induced by such shocks, and this requires imposing more structure on the
model which may not be appropriate. Instead, we perform a simple robust-
ness check by assuming an extreme case: perfect correlation for all partici-
pants who enroll on the same day. To do this, we compute the average
percentage allocated to each asset class by all participants who enrolled on
each day. We then perform a separate time-series regression of these aver-
ages for each firm on the firm-specific independent variables used in equa-
tion (1). Furthermore, we allow for error correlation across days
by computing Newey–West (1987) robust standard errors. Even in this
extreme case, the evidence confirms that past returns affect contribution
allocations.
The strongest evidence is for the company stock fraction, where two of
the three firms show a positive and significant impact of past company
stock returns on the company stock fraction, and one of the companies
shows a positive and significant impact of past S&P 500 returns.8 For
other equity, the results are consistent with participant-level evidence in
Table 7-3: Coefficients on company stock are negative and significant for
two firms, and the coefficients on S&P 500 are negative (but insignificant)
for all three firms. For total equity, these results again appear to cancel,
with no strong pattern to the coefficient signs. Thus, it appears that past
returns have mainly a compositional effect within total equity as for the
individual-level results in Table 7-3, with high past returns leading to
higher fractions allocated to company stock and lower fractions allocated
to other equity.
7 / Employee Investment Decisions about Company Stock 129
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Analysis of Changes in Contribution Fractions
After examining snapshots of flows and the impact of past returns on these
snapshots, we now turn to an examination of the determinants of the
changes in these flows. To explore how past returns affect changes to flow
fractions, we shift attention away from returns preceding enrollment to
focus on returns preceding specific changes.
Table 7-4 summarizes the results of Logit regressions for the probability
that a participant boosts his company stock fraction (column 1), other equity
fraction (column 2), and total equity fraction (column 3). The dependent
variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the fraction is increased and
zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are as before except that SP500 and
CSTOCK represent for the year immediately preceding the contribution frac-
tion change. The sample includes every change made by any participant who
was active in the plans at year-ends 1998 or 1999.9
The results demonstrate more evidence of the powerful impact of past
returns on participant behavior. As in the previous section, that the coeffi-
cient on CSTOCK is again positive and significant for the company stock
regressions (column 1). In this case, however, the coefficient is also positive
(and nearly significant) for other equities, so it appears that company stock
does not crowd out other equities when contributions are changed. The net
effect of CSTOCK on total equity is positive and significant (column 3).
Another contrast with Table 7-3 is that the coefficient on SP500 is negative
and significant for company stock (column 1) and is positive and significant
for the total equity fraction. In this case, high returns on the marketwide
component of company stock returns induce a shift away from company
stock and towards other equity, with a new effect of shifts towards equity and
away from other assets (column 3). Overall, participants act like momentum
investors for total equity.
As in the previous section, there may be concern that the standard errors
in Table 7-4 could be understated, due to firm-specific shocks. To check
robustness, we again collapse all participant observations on each trading
day down to a single observation for each firm. To do this, we construct a
new dependent variable, Ymnt, for each asset class m (company stock, other
equity, or total equity) at each firm n on every trading date t. Ymnt is a frac-
tion, where the numerator is the number of participants in firm n who
increased their flow fraction to asset m on date t, minus the number of
participants in firm n who made an allocation change to any fund on date
t but did not increase their flow fraction to asset m. The denominator is all
participants at firm n who made any allocation change on date t. We then
estimate separate time series regressions for each firm, to determine
whether the qualitative results from Table 7-4 also hold here. The answer
is yes: several coefficients are significant and have the same sign as their
analogues in Table 7-4.10 These significant coefficients are negative for one
firm on SP500 and positive for two firms for CSTOCK in the company stock
130 James J. Choi et al.
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TABLE 7-4 Probability of Increasing Contribution Fraction, 12/31/1992 to
3/3/2000, as a Function of Asset Returns Prior to the Election Change
Company Stock Other Equities All Equities
SP500 2.09** 2.85** 1.02**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
CSTOCK 0.59** 0.06 0.23**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Std(SP500) 148.70** 39.67** 47.97**
(5.45) (4.58) (4.60)
Std(CSTOCK) 1.62 5.40 16.49**
(3.97) (3.42) (3.40)
Salary 0.14* 0.02 0.09**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Total Balances 0.14** 0.08** 0.13**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age /100 2.66** 3.73** 4.18**
(0.69) (0.58) (0.58)
Age 2/1000 0.23** 0.47** 0.40**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Tenure 0.01 0.04** 0.18**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend  0.40** 0.36** 0.20**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend  0.02 0.10** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend  0.22** 0.00 0.23**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
Notes: This table presents the results of a binary logit regression of the probability a particip-
ant increases the fraction of his or her contribution to company stock (column 1), other
equities (column 2), and all equities (column 3), conditional on making a change to his or
her contribution allocations. SP500 is the cumulative return on the S&P 500 for the 253
trading days prior to the participant’s first contribution after an election change. CSTOCK
is the cumulative return in excess of the S&P 500 on company stock for the 253 trading days
prior to the post-change contribution. Std(SP500) and Std(CSTOCK) are the standard devia-
tions of the S&P 500 and company stock returns, respectively, over the 253 trading days
prior to the post-change contribution. Salary is the log of annual salary in the year of the
post-change contribution, and Total Balances is the log of total balances in the plan in the
calendar month prior to the change, both in 1999 CPI-deflated dollars. Age is the partici-
pant’s age at the time of the post-change contribution, Age 2 is the square of Age, and Tenure
is the log of one plus the years between the participant’s original hire date and the post-
change contribution. Company Trend x is the years between December 31, 1980 and the par-
ticipant’s post-change contribution if the participant is in company x, and zero otherwise.
Coefficients on fixed-effect company dummies and a constant are not shown. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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regressions; positive for two firms on SP500 and negative for one firm
on CSTOCK in the other equity regressions; and positive for one firm on
SP500 in the total equity regressions. Meanwhile, no coefficients are signi-
ficant with the opposite sign from their analogues in Table 7-4.
Analysis of Trading Behavior
The previous sections analyzed the determinants of contribution fractions–
investment flows—to company stock and other equity. Many researchers
focus on flows because these data allow for the cleanest test of the impact of
past returns on investment decisions. By contrast, studies of asset holdings
and past returns suffer from an obvious problem: High returns through
price appreciation on any given asset will tend to increase the fraction of that
asset in overall holdings, even if investors take no action. Nevertheless, it is
asset holdings, not flows, that drive the long-run distribution of wealth. In an
extreme scenario, one could imagine that all participants rebalance their
holdings on a regular basis, so that differences in flows cause only minor
long-run differences in their portfolio allocations.
For example, consider a participant who wanted to have 5 percent of his
overall holdings in company stock. Suppose further that this participant
allocated 20 percent to company stock at initial enrollment, because the
participant had not yet decided to limit company stock to 5 percent of his or
her overall portfolio. In later years, he or she could change the contribution
fraction in company stock to 5 percent, but would still need to rebalance the
participants’ holdings periodically, to ensure that the 5 percent fraction was
maintained. It may be the case that it is found to be simpler to rebalance his
or her holdings periodically to 5 percent and ignore the flow component in
the short run. If so, even though contribution fractions might appear to be
influenced by returns prior to enrollment, we would not notice any long-
run impact of these fractions on portfolio diversification.
To examine this possibility, we look at the rebalancing decision (“trades”)
with the same methods used to study changes in the flow fraction. We take
every trade initiated by employees who have positive balances or plan activ-
ity in 1998 or 1999, and then we estimate a separate Logit regression for
each asset class, where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the
trade increased holdings in that asset class and zero otherwise.11
Results appear in Table 7-5, and the key evidence appears in column 1.
Here we see that returns one year prior to the trade on both components of
company stock returns (CSTOCK and SP500) induce participants to trade
out of company stock, but only for SP500 is there a significant effect. For
both components, high returns induce participants to substitute away from
company stock and towards other equities, with positive and significant
coefficients on both components in column 2. These results are consistent
with “profit-taking” behavior found in other studies where investors tended
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TABLE 7-5 Probability of Trading into Asset Class, 1/4/1993 to 3/6/2000, as a 
Function of Asset Returns Prior to Trade
Company Stock Other Equities All Equities
SP500 2.18** 2.31** 0.09
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
CSTOCK 0.01 0.31** 0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Std(SP500) 159.70** 71.28** 62.22**
(4.24) (3.86) (3.71)
Std(CSTOCK) 36.62** 20.47** 26.88**
(2.33) (2.26) (2.14)
Salary 0.04** 0.08** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total Balances 0.07** 0.02** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Age/100 4.47** 2.83** 1.24**
(0.56) (0.50) (0.48)
Age 2/1000 0.52** 0.26** 0.09
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Tenure 0.07** 0.05** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend  0.50** 0.26** 0.15**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend  0.10** 0.12** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Company Trend  0.56** 0.26** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
Notes: This table presents the results of a binary logit regression of the probability a particip-
ant makes a trade increasing his or her holdings in company stock (column 1), other equi-
ties (column 2), or all equities (column 3), conditional on the participant trading. SP500 is
the cumulative return on the S&P 500 for the 253 trading days prior to the trade. CSTOCK
is the cumulative returns in excess of the S&P 500 on company stock for the 253 trading
days prior to the trade. Std(SP500) and Std(CSTOCK) are the standard deviations of the S&P
500 and company stock returns, respectively, over the 253 trading days prior to the trade.
Salary is the log of annual salary in the year of the trade, and Total Balances is the log of total
balances in the plan on the day of the trade, both in 1999 CPI-deflated dollars. Age is the
participant’s age at the time of the post-change contribution, Age2 is the square of Age, and
Tenure is the log of one plus the years between the participant’s original hire date and the
trade date. Company Trend x is the years between December 31, 1980 and the participant’s
trade if the participant is in company x, and zero otherwise. Coefficients on fixed-effect
company dummies and a constant are not shown. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses below the point estimates.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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to sell “winner” stocks and hold “loser” stocks (Odean, 1998; Grinblatt and
Keloharju, 2001). Somewhat paradoxically, the net effect on total equity
is positive and significant for the CSTOCK component, perhaps because
rising prices on company stock induce participants to feel wealthier and less
risk-averse.
We next perform an analogous analysis at the firm level, using the same
approach described in previous sections. The dependent variable here is
the number of participants who increased their holdings of the respective
asset class on day t, minus the number of participants who made any trade
but did not increase their holdings of the respective asset class on day t, all
divided by the number of participants who made any trade on day t. We
estimate separate regressions for each asset class for each firm. Even in this
extreme case, this evidence indicates that past returns affect contribution
allocations. Consistent with the results of Table 7-5, we find that the coeffi-
cient on SP500 is negative and significant for one firm, and it is negative but
insignificant for the other two. For other equity, the coefficients on SP500
are positive and significant for all three firms. Overall, then, it appears that
participants act as contrarians in their trades for company stock.
Conclusions
Our analysis has studied the decisions of almost 100,000 individual 401(k)
participants, seeking a better understanding of the determinants of
employee discretionary investment in company stock. We study three com-
panies, which include many participants, though the sample is still small
relative to the universe of 401(k) participants, and it includes a relatively
low level of company stock holdings. The great detail in the data, however,
allows for an analysis at several different stages in the 401(k) process, and
our main conclusion is that past returns matter at every stage. Thus, high
returns on company stock for the year prior to enrollment induce particip-
ants to make higher initial contributions to company stock. Furthermore,
high returns over any one-year period induce participants to increase these
contribution fractions. High returns on company stock have the opposite
effect on trading decisions: High past returns induce participants to realloc-
ate their portfolios away from company stock and toward other equities.
Thus, participants are momentum investors when making decisions about
investment flows, but they appear to be contrarian investors when making
trading decisions.
Our results allow us to build on the important work of Benartzi (2001),
who found a positive relationship between past returns on company stock
and current contributions to company stock, with the strongest results
for past 10-year return, and weaker results for shorter horizons. We can
explain that result as the combination of several forces. First, when particip-
ants join, they are influenced by the past returns, including the past 
one-year return. Some participants never alter their initial contribution
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fractions, and so while specific past years may seem influential at any point
in time, the influence of the most recent year will be limited. Second, some
participants do make change, but these changes are infrequent, and fewer
than 40 percent make changes in any given year. These changes are influ-
enced by prior returns, but the influence of the most recent year tends to
be limited. Taken together, initial contributions and contribution changes
are both influenced by one-year returns, but these years are spread out
over a long period. Consequently, if we seek to understand the relationship
between current contributions and past returns, the longer period appears
better at the company level.
The most interesting and policy-relevant findings pertain to the relation-
ship between asset holdings and past returns. Absent frequent rebalancing,
high returns on assets will tend to increase the portfolio allocation to these
assets. This makes it difficult to directly test for a relationship between asset
holdings and past returns on these assets. The best we can do is to try to
infer these relationships by looking at different decisions made by investors.
Since most previous studies have used cross-sectional snapshots of holdings
and contribution fractions, they have logically focused on the latter as the
cleanest source of data. These studies find—as do we—that high past
returns on company stock tend to increase contribution fractions to com-
pany stock. Nevertheless, the time-series data used here show that trading
decisions may work to mitigate some of this effect. Since high past returns
induce participants to substitute out of company stock, the strong relation-
ship between past returns and contributions is less dangerous for asset
allocation than it might appear.
Notes
1 The original source for these percentages is Schultz and Francis (2002),
reported by Mitchell and Utkus (2003).
2 For example, he notes that “a 25-year-old employee who wanted to buy an insur-
ance policy on company stock that he cannot reallocate until he is 50 years old”
would have to pay $739 per $1000 of value.
3 For a discussion of this literature, see Goetzmann and Massa (2002).
4 Several other recent papers have used participant-level panel data to explore
different aspects of 401(k) investment behavior, but none of these papers have
focused on company stock. See Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), Ameriks and
Zeldes (2001), Choi et al. (2002a, b).
5 Omitting international funds from the definitions of other equity and total
equity does not qualitatively alter the results of the paper. For balanced funds, we
include the fraction of that fund targeted to equities.
6 These figures omit trades and allocation changes that were initiated by the plan
administrators.
7 Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) survey this literature and discuss new evidence from
a survey of TIAA-CREF participants.
8 Complete results are not presented here but are available from the authors on
request.
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9 We omit changes made at Gamma in November 1996 and April 1998 because
numerous funds were shut down in those months, so allocation changes then may
have been due to the plan administration automatically shifting contributions away
from the closed funds.
10 Complete results are not presented here but are available from the authors on
request.
11 We omit trades that were initiated by plan administrators.
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